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I. INTRODUCTION 
If you don’t have liberty and self-determination, you [have] nothing. 
That’s what this country’s built on and [it] is the ultimate self-
determination to determine when and how you’re gonna die when you’re 
suffering.1 
Conversations about death are not commonplace in today’s world. The topic 
is considered taboo by many.2 For whatever reason, it is a discussion that many 
want to avoid.3 This unhealthy view on death often results in individuals not im-
plementing a plan for their eventual demise.4 Without proper planning for end-of-
life decisions, many have taken matters into their own hands.5 Health-related elder 
                                                          
 1. People v. Kevorkian, 639 N.W.2d 291, 300 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting a statement Dr. 
Jack Kevorkian made during a “60 Minutes” interview). 
 2. See Beverly Lytton, Majority of Americans Avoid Addressing End-of-Life Issues, According 
to New Study, EUREKALERT (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2013-12/ehs-
moa120413.php; see also Peter Saul, Let’s Talk About Dying, TEDED (Jun. 9, 2013), 
http://ed.ted.com/lessons/let-s-talk-about-dying-peter-saul#review. 
 3. Lytton, supra note 2.  
 4. Id. 
 5. DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL EXIT: THE PRACTICALITIES OF SELF-DELIVERANCE AND ASSISTED 
SUICIDE FOR THE DYING XXVI (3d ed. 2002). 
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suicide is an epidemic and considerable sympathy has been given to mercy killers.6 
Peculiar as it may be, there has even been a “how-to” guide for those that wish to 
take their own life because of their failing health.7 The book, Final Exit, is written 
by Derek Humphry—an active leader in the right-to-die movement and the founder 
of The Hemlock Society.8 Final Exit gives the reader a framework of what to do in 
the event that he or she would like to take his or her own life.9 Mr. Humphry pro-
vides protective steps that should be taken in the event that someone decides to take 
their own life.10 The book also gives the reader a variety of options to carry out 
their plan, and explains the advantages and disadvantages of each one.11 Mr. 
Humphry believes that the freedom to die is “the ultimate civil liberty.”12 Further, 
he posited the question: “If we cannot go to our deaths in the manner of our own 
choosing, what liberty do we have?”13 
That is precisely what this comment is about: the liberty to choose how and 
when to end your own life. Specifically, this article is about the liberty to choose 
how to end your own life in advance of impending cognitive loss. This comment 
explores the treatment options currently available to those diagnosed with dementia 
(essentially, palliative care) and finds the current treatment options insufficient for 
most of those that are suffering. Next, this article examines physician-assisted 
death, and specifically details which states have legalized it and the conditions of 
that legalization. 
Part III of this comment discusses the history of physician-assisted death 
(PAD) in the United States. This section focuses largely on the legacy of Dr. Jack 
Kevorkian and the well-known United States Supreme Court case of Cruzan v. 
Missouri Department of Health,14 which recognized a right to terminate life-
sustaining treatment. Part III also considers the United States Supreme Court cases 
of Washington v. Glucksburg15 and Vacco v. Quill,16 and their effect on the right the 
Court recognized in Cruzan to terminate life-sustaining treatment. Part IV gives a 
brief description of some of the shortfalls of the rights recognized by the Supreme 
Court and the statutes adopted in the states that permit physician-assisted death. 
Part V explores the possibility of physician-assisted death for those diagnosed 
with dementia and addresses the legal, philosophical, and social issues regarding 
this idea. This comment concludes with a proposed solution to this dilemma. This 
solution combines guardianship with an advanced directive for healthcare to, essen-
tially, delegate the end-of-life decision to a trusted friend or relative. 
                                                          
 6. Id. Mercy killing occurs when “desperate people . . . unilaterally kill their loved ones in the 
belief that it is the only compassionate thing to do.” Id.  
 7. See generally id. 
 8. Id.  
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. (Mr. Humphry suggests that individuals contemplating self-deliverance should, in addi-
tion to other things, tell their close family and friends, seek counseling, and write letters to loved ones ex-
plaining the decision.). 
 11. See generally HUMPHRY, supra note 5. 
 12. Legalizing Euthanasia: Medical Perspectives on Death and Dying, SANTA CLARA UNIV., 
https://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v4n2/euthanasia.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 15. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 16. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
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Because we already allow guardians to assume the responsibilities and deci-
sion-making (including decisions affecting end-of-life) for those without the capac-
ity to do so, I see no reason as to why this decision-making authority can’t extend 
to other end-of-life decisions, as long as there is an advanced directive stating the 
wishes of the now-demented. Currently, a person can legally delegate all of his 
decision-making power to a surrogate to make decisions for him if he is ever una-
ble to make decisions for himself. This is evidenced by legal guardianship, do-not-
resuscitate orders, powers of attorney, and healthcare directives. If a person ex-
presses his desire to end his life at a certain point when he is unable to legally make 
that decision for himself because of lack of capacity, he should have the option to 
set a plan for what is to happen to him when he reaches that point. It seems that this 
decision is best left to a trusted friend or relative because this threshold is an ex-
tremely difficult one to determine—but, it is not an impossible threshold to deter-
mine, and delegating this decision to someone you trust is the best option. 
II. THE STRUGGLE OF DEMENTIA 
If someone were to ask you to imagine your death, how would you picture it? 
Are you surrounded by loved ones? Are you home or in another comfortable place? 
Are you doing something you love? Whatever it is that you are imagining, I am 
certain that it does not involve intense pain and suffering, a loss of self-control, or a 
loss of dignity. Unfortunately, that is exactly how many lives end in the United 
States and abroad every year. An appalling number of people die every year from 
painful, debilitating illnesses. 
Alzheimer’s disease (#6) is among the top ten causes of death in the United 
States according to a 2011 report.17 Interestingly, this disease is not included in the 
top ten causes of death worldwide.18 One may speculate that the reason for this 
discrepancy could be the exceptional medical care and technology in the United 
States, which allows people to live longer than in many other countries.19 
Over time, Alzheimer’s disease destroys a person’s memory and other brain 
functions.20 Alzheimer’s is the most common type of dementia.21 Dementia is a 
disease that encompasses several brain disorders that all impair a person’s intellec-
tual and social skills.22 Alzheimer’s causes brain cells to decay and eventually die, 
                                                          
 17. Donna L. Hoyert & Jiaquan Xu, Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2011, 61 NAT’L VITAL STAT. 
REP. 1, 3–4 (Oct. 10, 2012), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_06.pdf (the 
other causes of death on this list included: heart disease, malignant neoplasms, respiratory diseases, cere-
brovascular diseases, accidents, diabetes, influenza & pneumonia, nephritis, and suicide). 
 18. The Top 10 Causes of Death, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (May 2014), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs310/en/ (included in the top ten are: heart disease, stroke, 
respiratory infection, pulmonary disease, diarrheal diseases, HIV/AIDS, trachea bronchus, diabetes, road 
injury, and prematurity). 
 19. For a list of the average life expectancy rates in various countries, see The World Factbook, 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2102rank.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2015) (The United States is listed as number 42 
highest average life expectancy out of 223). 
 20. Diseases and Conditions: Alzheimer’s Disease, MAYO CLINIC (Jun. 17, 2014), 
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/alzheimers-disease/basics/definition/CON-20023871. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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interfering with a person’s daily life.23 The late stages of Alzheimer’s can last as 
few as several weeks or as long as several years.24 “[A]round-the-clock assistance” 
is usually required during the late stages of Alzheimer’s and the care generally fo-
cuses on “preserving quality of life and dignity and treating the person with com-
passion and respect.”25 A person in the late stages of Alzheimer’s disease usually 
“[h]as difficulty eating and swallowing, [n]eeds assistance walking and eventually 
becomes bed-ridden or chair-bound, [n]eeds full time help with personal care, in-
cluding toileting, [i]s vulnerable to infections and pneumonia, [and] [l]oses the abil-
ity to communicate with words.”26 Currently, there is no cure for Alzheimer’s dis-
ease, and the only treatment option is palliative care.27  
   A. The Palliative Care Option 
Palliative care is, essentially, “end-of-life” treatment that focuses on improv-
ing the quality of life and providing comfort to those with serious and life-
threatening illnesses.28 Palliative care is used to treat individuals who have been 
diagnosed with cancer, AIDS, kidney failure, etc.; plainly, it is used for a very wide 
spectrum of illnesses.29 There are several benefits of palliative care, which can in-
clude pain management, integration of the psychological aspect of patient care, 
development of meaningful relationships, preservation of personal integrity, a sense 
of control, a sense of dignity, and a sense of autonomy.30 
However, there are also several negative aspects of palliative care, particular-
ly for the terminally ill and their families. It can reduce the hope of recovery, di-
minish savings, and require considerable commitment from family members.31 In-
deed, palliative care can reduce the hope for recovery because the “focus is on re-
lieving symptoms, not in curing the disease.”32 Additionally, the costs of palliative 
care can be considerable,33 and insurance companies may be unwilling to help pay 
these costs so families often have to pay out-of-pocket.34 These costs can be exten-
sive as to drain any inheritance that the patient had planned on distributing.35 A 
recent study found that the annual cost for a patient with dementia ranges between 
                                                          
 23. Id. 
 24. Late Stage Care, ALZ.ORG, http://www.alz.org/nyc/in_my_community_17737.asp (last visit-
ed Mar. 25, 2015). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Alzheimer’s Disease Health Center, WEBMD, 
http://www.webmd.com/alzheimers/guide/alzheimers-disease-treatment-care (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
 28. Katherine Kam, What is Palliative Care?, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/palliative-
care/what-is-palliative-care (last visited Feb. 20, 2015). 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Benefits of Palliative Care, PALLIATIVE DOCTORS, 
http://www.palliativedoctors.org/benefits/index.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2015); see also What Are the 
Pros and Cons of Palliative Care for Cancer?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-are-the-pros-
and-cons-of-palliative-care-for-cancer.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Pros and Cons]. 
 31. Pros and Cons, supra note 30. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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$41,000 and $56,000.36 It is estimated that these costs will more than double by 
2040 because of the increase in population.37 Because of the longevity of dementia, 
one can easily imagine how quickly a life savings can be spent at this rate. 
Palliative care is an excellent option for some, but it is certainly not optimal 
for everyone. The extensive advances in modern healthcare technology and medi-
cine have made it possible to “indiscriminately maintain[] . . . some of the vital 
functions of the body, but the same technology does not necessarily allow us to 
heal underlying disease processes.”38 An inadvertent byproduct of these advances 
in technology has been the ability of doctors and hospitals to preserve the lives of 
patients in a state of “suspended animation” for extended, and sometimes indefi-
nite, time periods.39 These patients are physically alive because they are supplied 
with the necessary nutrition, hydration, and ventilation, but they are not alive in the 
sense that they are able to enjoy life.40 
In other words, the advances in modern technology have led to a sort of “de-
layed death” (often under the guise of “pain management”) without treating or cur-
ing the actual illness itself. Not everyone wants to delay the inevitable. In fact, 
some want to hasten it. The primary purpose of palliative care is “pain manage-
ment”; however, the management of pain in terminally ill patients often leads to 
over-medication in an attempt to alleviate the patient’s chronic pain. Over-
medication can lead to living in a sort-of “haze,” which some would argue is no 
quality of life at all. But what other options are there for the terminally ill? 
B. Physician-Assisted Death 
Physician-assisted death (sometimes known as physician-assisted suicide) is 
an option for the terminally ill in some states,41 but several states actually criminal-
ize the act.42 Physician-assisted suicide and physician-assisted death have essential-
ly the same meaning, explained in detail below.43 Over the years, there has been an 
abundance of misleading and often confusing information presented to the public 
(usually through the media) regarding physician-assisted death.44 All too often, the 
                                                          
 36. Michael D. Hurd et al., Monetary Costs of Dementia in the United States, 368 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 1326, 1342 (2013), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMsa1204629#t=article. 
 37. Id. 
 38. David Crippen, Medical Treatment for the Terminally Ill: The ‘Risk of Unacceptable Bad-
ness,’ 9 CRIT. CARE 317, 317 (May 10, 2005) available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1269444/. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 127.815 (2014). 
 42. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4017 (2014). Idaho is one of twenty-five states that make 
assisted death a felony. State-by-State Guide to Physician-Assisted Suicide, PROCON.ORG, 
http://euthanasia.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000132 (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) [hereinafter 
State-by-State Guide]. Additionally, nine states that criminalize physician-assisted death describe it as man-
slaughter. Id. 
 43. There are several additional terms used to describe this concept, including “physician aid-in-
dying” and “death with dignity.” Physician-assisted suicide was the term that was popularized in the 1990s 
by Dr. Jack Kevorkian, but the more diplomatic terms used today are physician-assisted death, physician 
aid-in-dying, death with dignity, etc. 
 44. See e.g., Regan Brown, My Turn by Reagan Brown: Assisted Suicide is Murder, SALISBURY 
POST (Jan. 26, 2015, 12:00 AM), available at http://www.salisburypost.com/2015/01/26/assisted-suicide-is-
murder/. 
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terms “physician-assisted suicide/death” and “euthanasia” have been used inter-
changeably, but there is a very important distinction between these two concepts.45 
“Assisted suicide” is defined as “[t]he intentional act of providing a person 
with the medical means or the medical knowledge to commit suicide.”46 Further, 
the definition provides that “physician-assisted suicide” occurs “when a doctor 
provides the means.”47 Contrarily, “euthanasia” is defined as “[t]he act or practice 
of causing or hastening the death of a person who suffers from an incurable or ter-
minal disease or condition, esp[ecially] a painful one, for reasons of mercy.”48 Eu-
thanasia is divided into two sub-categories. “Active euthanasia” is defined as “eu-
thanasia performed by a facilitator (such as a healthcare practitioner) who not only 
provides the means of death but also carries out the final death-causing act.”49 
“Passive euthanasia” is “[t]he act of allowing a terminally ill person to die by either 
withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining support such as a respirator or feeding 
tube.”50 
In other words, the essential difference between euthanasia and physician-
assisted death is the act that causes the death. In assisted death, the actual death is 
caused by the patient. In euthanasia, the death is caused by another party, usually a 
physician. Currently, active euthanasia is illegal in every state in the United 
States.51 Euthanasia is legal in only a few countries: Belgium, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands.52 
i. Legalization 
Physician-assisted death is illegal in most states; in fact, it is a felony in Ida-
ho.53 Currently, there are only three54 states in the U.S. that statutorily permit phy-
sician-assisted death: Oregon, Vermont, and Washington.55 Oregon’s Death with 
Dignity Act (DWDA) was the first of its kind in the United States and faced several 
                                                          
 45. Rita L. Marker, Euthanasia, Assisted Suicide & Health Care Decisions: Protecting Yourself 
& Your Family, PATIENTS RIGHTS COUNCIL, http://www.patientsrightscouncil.org/site/euthanasia-assisted-
suicide-health-care-decisions/ (last visited March 17, 2015). 
 46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1571 (9th ed. 2009). 
 47. Id. (emphasis added). 
 48. Id. at 634. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. Euthanasia is further divided into voluntary, involuntary, and nonvoluntary. Id. Voluntary 
is “[e]uthanasia performed with the terminally ill person’s consent.” Id. Involuntary is “[e]uthanasia of a 
competent, nonconsenting, person.” Nonvoluntary is “[e]uthanasia of an incompetent, and therefore non-
consenting, person.” Id. 
 51. State-by-State Guide, supra note 42. 
 52. International Perspectives: Legal Status of Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, PROCON.ORG, 
http://euthanasia.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000136 (last visited March 27, 2015). 
 53. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4017 (2011) (Idaho makes it a felony for any person to assist anoth-
er person in committing suicide, and anyone found guilty under this statute will be sentenced to not more 
than five years in prison. Additionally, if a health care professional is found guilty under this statute, the 
health care professional may have his or her license revoked by the licensing authority).  
 54. See Death with Dignity Around the U.S., DEATH WITH DIGNITY NATI’L CTR. (last updated 
Feb. 11, 2015), available at http://www.deathwithdignity.org/advocates/national (providing the most updat-
ed information on current DWDA pending across the nation). 
 55. Oregon Death with Dignity Act § 127.800–.995 (West 2014); Vermont Protection of Patient 
Choice at the End of Life Act tit. 18, § 5281–92 (West 2013); Washington Death with Dignity Act § 
70.245.010–.904 (West 2014). 
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of its own challenges.56 The law was approved by Oregon voters in 1994 in a gen-
eral election.57 But implementation of DWDA was delayed by a legal injunction 
until 1997 when Oregon voters reaffirmed their support for the law.58 The law was 
challenged several times throughout the following ten years but all of the challeng-
es have been futile.59 
Oregon’s DWDA provides for aid-in-dying to Oregon residents who are 
“terminally ill” and have the capacity to make a voluntary, written request for med-
ication to end his or her life.60 To be “terminally ill,” a patient must have “an incur-
able and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, within a 
reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months.”61 The patient 
must make an informed decision, which means that the patient must be informed of 
his or her medical diagnosis and prognosis, the potential risks of the prescribed 
medication, the likely result of taking the prescribed medication, and the feasible 
alternatives, including but not limited to, comfort care, hospice care, and pain con-
trol.62 Additional requirements for the patient include: (1) getting a second opinion 
from another physician who confirms the diagnosis; (2) the second opinion must 
affirm that the patient is capable and acting voluntarily; (3) if appropriate, the pa-
tient must be referred to counseling; and (4) the patient must be informed that he or 
she can rescind the request at any time and in any manner.63 
Oregon releases annual reports regarding its DWDA.64 The 2013 report con-
sists of information received by the state as of January 22, 2014.65 Since the 1997 
enactment of the law, 1,173 Oregon residents have been prescribed DWDA medi-
cation; 752 of these individuals ingested the medication and subsequently died.66 
The following chart provides a helpful visual of the annual proportion of Oregon 
residents who actually ingested the lethal medication in comparison to those who 
were prescribed the medication.67 
                                                          
 56. Death with Dignity Law, OR. ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://oregonencyclopedia.org/articles/death_with_dignity_law/#.VND8tFuVJUQ (last visited March 27, 
2015). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.805 (West 2014). 
 61. Id. § 127.800. 
 62. Id. § 127.815. 
 63. Id. For a documentary detailing the journey of a few Oregon residents who used the Death 
with Dignity Act to end their own lives, as well as the passage of an assisted death law in Washington state, 
see HOW TO DIE IN OREGON (Clearcut Productions 2011) (this is a critically acclaimed documentary that 
has won several awards, including the “Grand Jury Prize” for documentaries at the 27th Sundance Film 
Festival). 
 64. Annual Reports, OR. HEALTH AUTH., 
http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Pages/
ar-index.aspx (last visited March 27, 2015). 
 65. OR. PUB. HEALTH DIV., OREGON’S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT—2013 1, 1 (2014), available 
at 
http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Docu
ments/year16.pdf. 
 66. Id. at 2. 
 67. Id. at 1. 
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FIGURE 1. Oregon DWDA Prescription Recipients and Deaths, 1998–2013. 
 
In 2013, there were 122 Oregon residents received lethal prescriptions, and at 
the time of the report, there were 71 known DWDA deaths for that same year.68 
Out of these 71 DWDA deaths in 2013, 63 of the prescriptions had been written in 
the same year and 8 of them had been written during the previous years (2011 and 
2012).69 The following chart provides a helpful visual of the specifics of the 2013 
DWDA deaths and written prescriptions.70 
 
 
  
                                                          
 68. Id. at 2. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 4. 
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FIGURE 2. Summary of DWDA Prescriptions Written and Medications Ingested in 
2013. 
 
The three most frequently mentioned concerns for these patients with the le-
thal prescription were: “loss of autonomy (93.0%), decreasing ability to participate 
in activities that made life enjoyable (88.7%), and loss of dignity (73.2%),” the 
same as in previous years.71 
Washington’s DWDA passed in 2008 and went into effect in 2009.72 It is 
modeled closely after Oregon’s DWDA.73 Vermont was the third (and currently 
final) state to enact its law to permit physician-assisted death (PAD).74 Each of 
these laws “allow mentally competent, terminally-ill adult state residents to volun-
tarily request and receive a prescription medication to hasten their death.”75 
                                                          
 71. OR. PUB. HEALTH DIV., supra note 65, at 3. 
 72. In Washington, DEATH WITH DIGNITY NAT’L CTR, http://www.deathwithdignity.org/in-
washington (last visited Feb. 17, 2015). 
 73. Id. 
 74. In Vermont, DEATH WITH DIGNITY NAT’L CTR., http://www.deathwithdignity.org/in-
vermont (last visited Mar. 27, 2015). 
 75. Death with Dignity: the Laws & How to Access Them, DEATH WITH DIGNITY NAT’L CTR., 
http://www.deathwithdignity.org/access-acts (last visited Mar. 27, 2015). 
556 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 51 
 
There is currently only one other state and one county in another state that 
recognizes physician-assisted death, but not through statute.76 Montana and Berna-
lillo County in New Mexico both permit PAD through judicial acceptance.77 The 
Montana Supreme Court first upheld PAD in Baxter v. Montana.78 There, the trial 
court held “Montana constitutional rights of individual privacy and human dignity, 
taken together, encompass the right of a competent terminally [ill] patient to die 
with dignity.”79 The judge further stated that doctors who aid their patients’ deaths 
would not be subject to prosecution.80  
The plaintiff in the Montana case was a seventy-five-year-old truck driver 
suffering from a terminal form of leukemia and wanted the option of assisted death 
when his suffering became unbearable.81 On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court 
avoided the constitutional question, but stated that physician-assisted death does 
not violate Montana’s public policy.82 The plaintiff in this case, Mr. Baxter, was 
quoted as saying: 
I have lived a good and long life, and have no wish to leave this world 
prematurely. As death approaches from my disease, however, if my suffer-
ing becomes unbearable I want the legal option of being able to die in a 
peaceful and dignified manner by consuming medication prescribed by my 
doctor for that purpose. Because it will be my suffering, my life, and my 
death that will be involved, I seek the right and responsibility to make that 
critical choice for myself if circumstances lead me to do so. I feel strongly 
that this intensely personal and private decision should be left to me and 
my conscience—based on my most deeply held values and beliefs, and af-
ter consulting with my family and doctor—and that the government should 
not have the right to prohibit this choice by criminalizing the aid in dying 
procedure.83 
Unfortunately, on December 5, 2008, the same day that the district court issued its 
ruling in his favor, Mr. Baxter died as a result of his leukemia.84 
The trial court in Bernalillo County, New Mexico held that “terminally ill res-
idents have a constitutional right to obtain ‘aid in dying.’”85 The trial court stated, 
“This court cannot envision a right more fundamental, more private or more inte-
gral to the liberty, safety and happiness of a New Mexican than the right of a com-
petent, terminally ill patient to choose aid in dying.”86 This case was filed by two 
doctors who sought protection against prosecution if they provided lethal medica-
tion to Aja Riggs, a 49-year-old cancer patient who did not “want to suffer need-
                                                          
 76. Erik Eckholm, New Mexico Judge Affirms Right to ‘Aid in Dying,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 
2014), at A16, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/us/new-mexico-judge-affirms-right-to-aid-in-
dying.html?_r=0. 
 77. Id.; Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1215–16 (Mont. 2009). 
 78. Id. at 1222. 
 79. Baxter v. Montana, 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482, 36 (Mont. Dist. 2008). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1–2.  
 82. Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1220. 
 83. Id. at 1223. 
 84. Id. at 1240 n.1. 
 85. Eckholm, supra note 76, at A13. 
 86. Id. 
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lessly at the end.”87 The judge held that “the liberty, safety and happiness interest 
of a competent, terminally ill patient to choose aid in dying is a fundamental right 
under our New Mexico Constitution.”88 
III. HISTORY OF PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH IN THE U.S. 
The debate over physician-assisted death in the United Stated was at its peak 
in the 1990s. This was in large part due to a few United States Supreme Court cases 
decided during that decade. But, perhaps a larger reason for this nationwide interest 
was a man who thrust himself into the forefront of this debate. Jack Kevorkian 
(A.K.A. “Dr. Death”) was a well-known public advocate of assisted death.89 
Dr. Kevorkian’s first assisted death was with a patient named Janet Adkins, 
who was a 54-year-old Oregon woman diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease.90 Ms. 
Adkins took her own life using a device created by Dr. Kevorkian, which he 
dubbed “the Mercitron.”91 The device caused a painless death by first releasing a 
drug that caused unconsciousness and then releasing a lethal dose of potassium 
chloride—which stopped Ms. Adkins’ heart as soon as it was reached.92 Dr. 
Kevorkian stated that a death through his device was akin to a death while sleep-
ing.93 Dr. Kevorkian wanted to make assisted death a controlled, regulated medical 
service.94 He pointed out that assisted deaths already occur and spoke of laypeople 
that have engaged in mercy killings by shooting, drowning, or suffocating one an-
other.95 He believed that it was irresponsible for doctors to allow these mercy kill-
ings to happen,96 and Dr. Kevorkian stated that his purpose was to “demonstrate 
[his] cardinal rule in ethics, which is, personal autonomy.”97 
Ms. Adkins wanted to end her life because she was experiencing some of the 
symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease and did not want to see the illness through.98 Ms. 
Adkins and her husband traveled to Michigan (the home state of Dr. Kevorkian) to 
meet with the doctor.99 After his own personal observations and researching Ms. 
Adkins’ medical records, Dr. Kevorkian concluded that Ms. Adkins did indeed 
have symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease, but also that she was rational and in a 
proper state of mind to make this decision.100 Ms. Adkins’ death occurred in Dr. 
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Kevorkian’s van at a local park (he had tried to find a different setting, but had 
been turned down at every venue).101 Ms. Adkins laid on a bed in Dr. Kevorkian’s 
van while Dr. Kevorkian connected her to a heart monitor and placed a needle in 
her arm to start the flow of a harmless saline solution.102 Ms. Adkins then pushed 
the button that released the sedative causing unconsciousness followed by the lethal 
dose of potassium chloride.103 Immediately after Ms. Adkins’ death, Dr. Kevorkian 
contacted the authorities to report it.104 During this procedure, it is reported that 
Ms. Adkins said, “Thank you, thank you so much,” to Dr. Kevorkian.105 
Ms. Adkins’ death occurred on June 4, 1990, years before Oregon adopted its 
DWDA.106 However, even today, Ms. Adkins would not have been able to access 
Oregon’s DWDA because she would not be considered “terminal.”107 Ms. Adkins’ 
death marked the beginning of Dr. Kevorkian’s public crusade as an advocate of 
physician-assisted death. He claimed to have helped more than 130 patients end 
their own lives from 1990 to 1998.108  
During the 1990s, Dr. Kevorkian escaped conviction in four separate assisted 
death trials.109 Three of those trials resulted in acquittals and one resulted in a mis-
trial.110 But, in 1999, he was convicted of second-degree murder and delivery of a 
controlled substance to his last patient, Thomas Youk.111 He was sentenced to 10 to 
25 years in prison.112 The 1999 trial was different than the previous ones in that it 
was the first time that a jury was deciding on a murder charge, rather than an assist-
ed death charge; it was also the first time Dr. Kevorkian acted as his own lawyer.113 
So, it begs the question, what was so different about Dr. Kevorkian’s last assisted 
death? 
The biggest difference was the patient. Dr. Kevorkian’s last patient, Thomas 
Youk, suffered from Lou Gehrig’s disease and had virtually lost all control of his 
body.114 The critical difference between Mr. Youk’s death and the deaths of the 
other patients was the act that caused death.115 Because Mr. Youk had essentially 
lost control of his bodily functions, Dr. Kevorkian injected Mr. Youk with the le-
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thal dose of medication rather than Mr. Youk controlling the injection of lethal 
medication himself.116 Additionally, Dr. Kevorkian videotaped the entire procedure 
and, perhaps as an act of defiance, sent that video to the popular news show 60 
Minutes.117 Thereafter, the video was nationally televised, resulting in even more 
media attention and debate.118 The judge who presided over Dr. Kevorkian’s last 
trial, Judge Jessica Cooper, said: 
This trial was not about the political or moral correctness of euthanasia, it 
was about you, sir. It was about lawlessness. . . . You had the audacity to 
go on national television, show the world what you did and dare the legal 
system to stop you. . . . Well, sir, consider yourself stopped.119 
In 2007, after eight years in prison, Dr. Kevorkian was released on the condi-
tion that he would never conduct another assisted death.120 In 2011, he passed away 
after a long struggle with kidney and respiratory problems.121 The official cause of 
his death was a blood clot.122 He passed away in a hospital room while listening to 
his favorite musical composer, Bach.123 His long-time attorney and friend said that 
if Dr. Kevorkian could have taken advantage of the option that he had offered oth-
ers, he would have.124 
A. Is There a Right to Die? 
When discussing physician-assisted death, the initial inquiry must always be: 
Is there a right to die? Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that there is a right to die 
in certain circumstances.125 Specifically, in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of 
Health, the Supreme Court stated that there is a “constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in avoiding unwanted medical treatment, including life-sustaining medical 
treatment such as artificial nutrition and hydration.”126 In other words, a person has 
a constitutionally protected right to refuse life-saving treatment.127 Cruzan involved 
a patient, Nancy Cruzan, who was in a persistent vegetative state after sustaining 
severe injuries in an automobile accident.128 She exhibited motor reflexes, but there 
was absolutely no indication of cognitive function.129 Nancy survived solely on 
artificial nutrition and hydration.130 
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Nancy’s parents filed a lawsuit in state court after their request was denied to 
have Nancy’s artificial nutrition and hydration terminated.131 The trial court subse-
quently authorized the termination of life support, and found that a person in Nan-
cy’s condition has a “fundamental right under the State and Federal Constitutions 
to direct or refuse the withdrawal of death-prolonging procedures.”132 The trial 
court also recognized the importance of a statement that Nancy had previously 
made to a housemate.133 Nancy had previously said that she would “not wish to 
continue her life if [she were] sick or injured unless she could live at least halfway 
normally.”134 The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision, stat-
ed that Missouri has a policy interest in the preservation of life, and that Nancy’s 
parents were not entitled to make the end-of-life determination for Nancy without 
clear and convincing evidence of the her wishes.135 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider “whether Cruzan has a right 
under the United States Constitution which would require the hospital to withdraw 
life-sustaining treatment from her under these circumstances.”136 The Court dis-
cussed, at length, the importance of informed consent, especially regarding medical 
treatment.137 The Court also pointed out the major advances in medical technology 
that have made it possible to “sustain[] life well past the point where natural forces 
would have brought certain death in earlier times.”138 The Court recognized several 
cases that have upheld the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, which were 
based on either the common-law right to informed consent alone, or the right of 
informed consent coupled with the constitutional right to privacy.139 The Court also 
stated that the Fourteenth Amendment provides a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest for a competent person to refuse unwanted medical treatment, but this liber-
ty interest must be balanced against the relevant state interests.140 
The Court recognized that the state has several relevant interests to protect, 
most notably, the preservation of human life and safeguarding against potential 
abuse of incompetent patients. Further, the Court stated Missouri had rightfully 
sought to advance these interests “through the adoption of a ‘clear and convincing’ 
standard of proof to govern such proceedings.”141 The Court affirmed the decision 
of the Missouri Supreme Court and held that the state could apply a “clear and con-
vincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guardian seeks to discontinue 
nutrition and hydration of a person in a persistent vegetative state.”142 In other 
words, although there is a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, there is not 
necessarily a right for a surrogate to make that decision for someone else.143 
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Justice Brennan wrote for the dissent, joined by Justice Marshall and Justice 
Blackmun.144 The beginning of their dissent states: 
Medical technology has effectively created a twilight zone of suspended 
animation where death commences while life, in some form, continues. 
Some patients, however, want no part of a life sustained only by medical 
technology. Instead, they prefer a plan of medical treatment that allows 
nature to take its course and permits them to die with dignity.145 
The dissent further explained “no state interest could outweigh the rights of an in-
dividual in Nancy Cruzan’s position.”146 And there is no “good to be obtained” by 
keeping Nancy Cruzan alive.147 Nor is there any benefit to society or any third per-
son, “and no harm to others will be averted.”148 The dissenters outright disagreed 
with the majority that the state has any interest is preserving someone’s life.149 Fur-
ther, the “only state interest that may be asserted is an interest in safe-guarding the 
accuracy of [Nancy’s] determination” of how she would “exercise her rights under 
these circumstances” and therefore the Court’s test should be on the accuracy of the 
determination.150 
Justice Stevens issued a dissent which began with a discussion of the “right of 
every person to ‘Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.’”151 Stevens wrote that 
“these three ends are compatible, mutually enhancing, and perhaps even coinci-
dent.”152 He concluded that “the Constitution requires the State to care for Nancy 
Cruzan’s life in a way that gives appropriate respect to her own best interests.”153 
Stevens believed that the Court failed Nancy’s best interests by putting this deci-
sion in the hands of the state legislature rather than her family.154 He believed 
“[t]he best interests of the individual, especially when buttressed by the interests of 
all related third parties, must prevail over any general state policy that simply ig-
nores those interests.”155 Stevens argued that Nancy’s interests were essentially 
commandeered by the state and subsequently ignored.156 
Two months after this Supreme Court ruling, Nancy’s parents requested an-
other hearing at the district court level to present new evidence of their daughter’s 
wishes from three of her co-workers.157 Finally, the State of Missouri withdrew 
from the case because “it had no further role to play” after the legal issue had been 
decided.158 At this hearing, Nancy’s co-workers testified that Nancy had said that 
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she would “never want to live ‘like a vegetable.’”159 At the same hearing, Nancy’s 
doctor recommended that Nancy’s feeding tube be removed and described Nancy’s 
existence as a “living hell.”160 Nancy’s court-appointed guardian agreed.161 The 
district court judge held this was clear and convincing evidence of Nancy’s wishes 
and permitted Nancy’s feeding tube to be removed.162 That same day, doctors re-
moved her feeding tube.163 Twelve days after the removal of her feeding tube, Nan-
cy died.164 Finally, eight years after Nancy’s car accident, her parents granted Nan-
cy her last wish.165  
B. Can the Right Recognized in Cruzan Extend to Assistance in Dying? 
In 1997, seven years after Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court decided 
two cases regarding physician-assisted death. The first of these cases was Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, which challenged a Washington state law prohibiting assisted 
death.166 The plaintiffs in this case were four Washington physicians, three termi-
nally ill patients (each of whom died before this case made it to the Supreme 
Court), and a nonprofit organization.167 Plaintiffs argued that this prohibition on 
assisted death violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.168 Plain-
tiffs sought a declaration that this law was, on its face, unconstitutional.169 They 
asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects the person-
al choice of a competent, terminally ill adult to engage in physician-assisted 
death.170 However, the Supreme Court held that Washington’s ban on assisted 
death did not violate the Due Process Clause because there is not a “fundamental 
liberty interest” in physician-assisted death.171 The Court framed the question as 
follows: “whether the ‘liberty’ specially protected by the Due Process Clause in-
cludes a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing 
so.”172 
The Court also recognized that assisted death is a crime in nearly every U.S. 
state and almost every Western democracy.173 The Court characterized these laws 
as “expressions of the States’ commitment to the protection and preservation of all 
human life.”174 The Court held the ban on assisted death was “reasonably related” 
to furthering Washington’s compelling state interests, including: preservation of 
human life, prevention of suicide, preservation of the integrity of the medical pro-
fession, protection of vulnerable groups (such as children and the elderly), and 
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avoidance of the “slippery slope” to voluntary and involuntary euthanasia.175 The 
Court concluded with an important caveat, stating: “Throughout the Nation, Amer-
icans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, 
and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to 
continue, as it should in a democratic society.”176 
Justice O’Connor was the swing vote in Glucksberg and issued a concur-
rence.177 Justice O’Connor agreed there was not a general right to commit suicide, 
but stated that the line between assisted death and legitimate medical care is a thin 
one.178 She said that patients in Washington who are experiencing great pain from a 
terminal illness can legally obtain necessary pain medication “to alleviate that suf-
fering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death.”179 In 
other words, the United States has effectively permitted hastening death as long as 
the purpose of the medication is pain prevention rather than suicide. In this particu-
lar instance, the death of the patient is considered a “side effect rather than a 
goal.”180 
Justice Stevens filed a separate concurrence in Glucksberg, and emphasized 
that the debate is still open regarding the limits that the Constitution has on the 
States’ power to punish physician-assisted death.181 He pointed out that there is “no 
absolute requirement that a State treat all human life as having an equal right to 
preservation.”182 Stevens argued that the fundamental liberty interest held by the 
three terminally ill plaintiffs in this case may have been higher than the liberty in-
terest held by Nancy Cruzan because of their constant pain and suffering.183 
“Avoiding intolerable pain and the indignity of living one’s final days incapacitated 
and in agony is certainly ‘[a]t the heart of [the] liberty . . . to define one’s own con-
cept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life.’”184 He argued that the liberty interest in this case was stronger than the right 
to refuse medical treatment.185 “It is an interest in deciding how, rather than wheth-
er, a critical threshold shall be crossed.”186 Justice Stevens argued that there is little 
difference between the terminally ill patient who decides to remove her life support 
and a terminally ill patient who seeks assistance in ending her life, because in both 
situations, the patient is seeking to hasten her imminent death.187 Further, the doc-
tor’s intent is essentially the same when terminating life support and when prescrib-
ing lethal medication.188 
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Vacco v. Quill, another landmark case in the physician-assisted death debate, 
was also decided in 1997.189 In Vacco, the Supreme Court held that New York’s 
ban on assisted death did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.190 The plaintiffs in Vacco included several New York public officials 
and three mentally competent terminally ill patients—all of whom died before the 
case reached the U.S. Supreme Court.191 The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit challenging 
the constitutionality of the New York statute prohibiting assisted death.192 The 
plaintiffs argued that “because New York permits a competent person to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment, and because the refusal of such treatment is ‘essen-
tially the same thing’ as physician-assisted suicide, New York’s assisted-suicide 
ban violates the Equal Protection Clause.”193 
The Court stated that the Equal Protection Clause does not create any substan-
tive rights and refused the argument that New York’s law drew any distinctions 
between different classes of people.194 The Court stated, “[e]veryone, regardless of 
physical condition, is entitled, if competent, to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical 
treatment; no one is permitted to assist a suicide. Generally, laws that apply even-
handedly to all ‘unquestionably comply’ with the Equal Protection Clause.”195 The 
Court concluded that New York’s ban on assisted death was related to a legitimate 
end, and upheld the same compelling state interests that the Court discussed in 
Glucksburg.196 
Neither Glucksburg nor Vacco recognized a constitutional right to physician-
assisted death; nor did they enforce a total ban. These cases kept the door open for 
state democratic processes to determine policies and laws for end-of-life care. 
In 2006, the Supreme Court implicitly addressed the right to physician-
assisted death when it ruled on the validity of Oregon’s DWDA in Gonzales v. Or-
egon.197 The issue in this case was the authority of the Attorney General (AG) to 
interpret the Controlled Substances Act (CSA)—the federal statute that regulates 
the lethal drugs that Oregon doctors prescribe to assist in death under the 
DWDA.198 The AG at the time, John Ashcroft, issued interpretive rules that deter-
mined that “using controlled substances to assist suicide is not a legitimate medical 
practice and that dispensing or prescribing them for this purpose is unlawful under 
the CSA.”199 The issue before the Court was the validity of the interpretive rule 
under the CSA.200 The Court resolved this issue based on statutory interpretation 
and concluded that the CSA did not authorize the AG to forbid doctors from pre-
scribing federally regulated drugs to terminally ill patients to assist in their 
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deaths.201 In other words, the Court had the opportunity to strike down the flagship 
DWDA in the United States, but chose not to do so. 
IV. IS THIS PROGRESS ENOUGH? 
Although the statutes passed by Oregon, Washington, and Vermont, along 
with the judicial acceptance in Montana and Bernalillo County in New Mexico 
represent considerable progress, it is not enough. After Dr. Kevorkian’s release 
from prison, he said: “They just don’t get it in Oregon . . . [o]r in Washington state 
or Montana . . . .”202 Dr. Kevorkian was not only an advocate for assisted death, he 
was also an advocate of human rights.203 In short, he believed every person should 
have the ability “to do whatever they wanted to do, without interference from doc-
tors, the states or the federal government.”204 
In fact, after Dr. Kevorkian’s release from prison, he zealously advocated for 
the Ninth Amendment of the United States Constitution.205 The Ninth Amendment 
states, “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be con-
strued to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”206 Dr. Kevorkian inter-
preted this to mean that every person in the United States can do whatever he or she 
wants, as long as it does not harm anyone else or anyone else’s property.207 He be-
lieved the Ninth Amendment gives us the freedom to live any way we choose, and 
to die in any way we choose.208 This freedom, he believed, includes the right to die 
with the help of a doctor, as long as the doctor has his or her consent.209 Dr. 
Kevorkian believed that, in addition to giving us the right to die, the Ninth 
Amendment gives us “[t]he right, he says in a stark example, to kill and eat some-
one, if that is their wish and they give their full consent to the act.”210 
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court has never viewed the Ninth 
Amendment as a source of any substantive rights.211 Rather, the Court has said that 
the Ninth Amendment plays a supportive role in the liberty rights that are implied 
in other amendments, but not specifically enumerated.212 Dr. Kevorkian was not 
alone in believing that the Ninth Amendment protects a wide array of liberties for 
Americans.213 Some commentators have even gone so far as to say that the Ninth 
Amendment has been “forgotten” by American jurisprudence.214 Perhaps the Su-
preme Court will change its analysis of the Ninth Amendment and determine that it 
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holds substantive rights retained by the people, rather than just using it as support 
for rights impliedly mentioned in the Constitution. But, until then, it is imperative 
that we extend the reach of the laws adopted in Oregon, Washington, and Vermont. 
The statutes adopted in Oregon, Washington, and Vermont do not go far 
enough. It is, of course, somewhat appeasing that there has been some progress in 
this field, but these statutes do not reach enough people. The stringent requirements 
to qualify for these laws drastically limits the number of people that have access to 
them.215 Among the several other requirements previously listed, a person must 
have a prognosis of six months to live in order to qualify for any of these state stat-
utes.216 
A. The Arbitrary “Six Month” Requirement 
When asked about the requirement of having a terminal disease in states with 
DWDAs, Dr. Kevorkian replied, “[w]hat difference does it make if someone is 
terminal? . . . We are all terminal.”217 Oregon218 defines a “terminal disease” as “an 
incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically confirmed and will, with-
in reasonable judgment, produce death within six months.”219 Dr. Kevorkian 
thought this six-month requirement was arbitrary, and believed that physician-
assisted death should be open to anyone who clearly expresses a desire to die.220 
In fact, Dr. Kevorkian went so far as to say that the laws in Oregon and 
Washington were “wrong” and aren’t providing a medical service.221 He believed 
doctors should be able to engage in euthanasia, meaning that doctors would com-
plete the act that causes the death.222 Even though Oregon, Washington, and Ver-
mont all have statutes permitting physician-assisted death, they all outlaw euthana-
sia.223 
These laws adopted in Oregon, Washington, and Vermont do not reach pa-
tients that are unable to take the lethal medication due to physical constraints.224 
Individuals that are physically unable to move or physically unable to swallow 
cannot take advantage of the DWDAs even if they meet all the other require-
ments.225 The current DWDAs, although a step in the right direction, only apply to 
a very small group of people—those with capacity to make the decision who have 
been diagnosed with a terminal illness and have a prognosis of only six months to 
live. 
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The right to physician-assisted death and euthanasia should extend to more 
individuals than it currently does. It should be an option available for all individu-
als who are free from mental illness and who clearly express a wish to die. This 
right should extend to more than just those who have a prognosis of six months to 
live. As such, the remainder of this article will focus on physician-assisted death as 
an option for those with dementia. 
V. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED DEATH AND DEMENTIA 
Two of the most oft-used phrases in the physician-assisted death debate are 
“death with dignity” and “unbearable suffering.”226 Undoubtedly, suffering from 
dementia can easily be associated with both a loss of dignity and unbearable suffer-
ing.227 Yet, the physician-assisted death movement in the United States has essen-
tially ignored the suffering of people diagnosed with dementia. Although patients 
suffering from Alzheimer’s disease will likely die from the disease, it is impossible 
to make any bright-line determinations similar to the “six months to live” require-
ment in current DWDAs.228  
In 2012, an estimated 35.6 million people were living with dementia world-
wide, with 7.7 million new cases every year.229 Also in 2012, an estimated 5.4 mil-
lion Americans were living with Alzheimer’s disease, the most common form of 
dementia.230 By 2050, it is estimated that this number may rise to 14 million, unless 
a cure is found.231 Alzheimer’s disease is the sixth most common cause of death in 
the U.S.232 With no cure in sight, it will likely stay in the top ten most common 
causes of death in the U.S. for the foreseeable future. 
A. Is Physician-Assisted Death for the Demented Possible? 
So, is physician-assisted death for the demented even possible? When answer-
ing this question, the biggest concern is the issue of consent. Contemporaneous 
consent is simply not possible for individuals diagnosed with dementia.233 The is-
sue of consent arises for anyone considering physician-assisted death.234 There will 
always be concerns about coercion by family members or physicians and about the 
mental health of the individual seeking physician-assisted death.235 But, today’s 
laws permitting physician-assisted death ensure that the patient makes an autono-
mous decision by ensuring that the patient has full information and assuring that the 
patient has the capacity to make the decision.236 
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For example, a cancer patient with six months to live has the knowledge and 
the mental capacity to make an autonomous choice, but a patient with dementia 
does not.237 Prior to the onset of dementia a patient has the capability to make au-
tonomous decisions, but he or she does not have full knowledge to make decisions 
about subsequent events.238 One could argue that making an end-of-life decision for 
some time in the future is similar to making any other choice regarding the future, 
albeit at a more significant juncture.239 Indeed, we often make decisions regarding 
our future selves; whether that be getting engaged, paying for an education, or 
booking plane tickets.240 The reality is that none of these plans may turn out as we 
projected, but the basic way that our mind functions will still be the same.241 
Making these sort of future plans is not akin to planning for middle to late 
stages of dementia.242 “In this situation, you are literally considering how you 
would think if your mechanisms for thinking and communicating were radically 
different.”243 Dementia affects each individual differently, in part due to the area 
and magnitude of the damage to the brain, but also because of the uniqueness of 
each individual.244 Some sufferers of dementia may retain their personality while 
others may experience dramatic personality changes; there is simply no way to 
know how the disease will affect a person or how the person will feel about their 
quality of life once the disease has set in.245 Additionally, all proposed and enacted 
statutes permitting physician-assisted death require persistent requests to die from 
the patient.246 While this type of consent would be possible for people in the early 
stages of dementia, it is unlikely that patients with middle- to late-stage dementia 
will be able to understand and evaluate the information necessary to make these 
requests.247 
B. Can a Living Will or Some Other Advanced Directive Resolve This Issue? 
Can the issue of contemporaneous consent be resolved with a living will or an 
advanced directive? The main goals of end-of-life care are to respect the choices of 
the patient and protect the best interests of the patient; however, these goals do not 
always align.248 Further, the law may not always advance these goals and may not 
provide assistance for resolving the conflicts between them.249 The purpose of a 
living will is to guide a patient’s family and physicians in making decisions regard-
ing end-of-life care.250 A durable power of attorney for healthcare appoints some-
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one to act as a principal’s agent and authorizes that person to deal with all medical 
situations when the patient is unable to speak for him or herself.251 Demented pa-
tients add a complexity to the law of living wills because of the disconnect between 
past self and present self, and because the level of capacity is constantly chang-
ing.252 Even though a dementia patient may not have the capacity to consent, he 
still may have a firm attitude and opinion on how he should live out the remainder 
of his days.253 
Even without these additional complications, living wills can fail for several 
reasons.254 First, people are simply unable to predict what they will want in every 
possible situation, which makes it impossible for living wills to encompass every 
possible situation.255 Second, health care providers may be unaware that a living 
will exists.256 And third, poorly drafted living wills can be, and often are, ambigu-
ous.257 
A person in the early stages of dementia can still have the mental capacity to 
execute an advanced directive laying out the terms under which the demented per-
son would want to end his or her own life.258 But, there are practical issues, philo-
sophical issues, and social issues that attach themselves to this possibility.259 
i. Practical Issues 
The practical issues that arise in this situation include drafting, interpretation, 
and implementation of the advanced directive.260 For example, when drafting this 
document, what would the demented person list as the criteria that would trigger 
the termination of life and how would these terms be measured?261 Suppose the 
criteria stated were the inability to recognize his spouse.262 When can the doctor be 
sure that this criteria has been met?263 This is not as transparent as one might ini-
tially imagine.264 How would the doctor tell when the demented no longer recog-
nizes his spouse?265 Is it when he no longer remembers her name, or is it when he 
no longer acts as if she holds sentimental meaning; and how do we decide that?266 
It may seem essentially impossible to draft an advanced directive that would 
unambiguously outline the criteria for a doctor to decide when the next steps should 
be taken, which is why it would be unwise to leave this final decision up to a phy-
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sician. Rather, this decision should be left to a trusted friend or relative that would 
better know what the demented person would have wanted. 
ii. Philosophical Issues 
 The philosophical issues that arise when considering physician-assisted death 
or euthanasia for the demented mostly include issues of personal autonomy. Adults 
with mental capacity are free to make their own autonomous decisions, whether 
those decisions are good or bad. 267 What matters is the freedom to choose.268 
Ronald Dworkin, a legal philosopher and public intellectual269 believed that when 
talking about the autonomy of a now-demented person, we should consider his 
rights and interests in two separate ways.270 Dworkin argued that we should consid-
er the autonomy of the person both “as a demented person, emphasizing his present 
situation and capacities, [and] as a person who has become demented, having an 
eye to the course of his whole life.”271 He phrased the question as: “Should what is 
done for him then be in his contemporary best interests, to make the rest of his life 
as pleasant and comfortable as possible, or in the best interests of the person he has 
been?”272 
Dworkin’s proposed solution to this issue is an idea that he called “precedent 
autonomy.”273 Precedent autonomy is the idea that we should give effect to an ad-
vanced directive executed by an individual that has since lost all mental capacity, 
even if the advanced directive asks for death.274 Dworkin posited several hypotheti-
cals about a woman who executed a formal advanced directive for several different 
possibilities.275 The first involved a directive stating that if she were to develop 
dementia, her property should be given to a charity so that none of it could be sold 
to pay for her care.276 Another hypothetical posed by Dworkin involved the woman 
requesting that she not receive treatment for any other life-threatening disease she 
may contract.277 In yet another hypothetical, the woman requested that she be killed 
as quickly and painlessly as possible if she were to contract a life-threatening dis-
ease.278 If this woman expressed these wishes when she had the mental capacity, 
would autonomy require that these wishes be respected?279 I believe that it would. 
Perhaps the best example of precedent autonomy is individuals who sign do-
not-resuscitate orders.280 These individuals object to treatment in advance, and are 
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unconscious when they are in need of the treatment.281 This patient’s “former deci-
sion remains in force because no new decision by a person capable of autonomy 
has annulled it.”282 Essentially, “precedent autonomy allows a now-capable person 
to control decisionmaking at a later point in time when he no longer has the capaci-
ty to do so.”283  
Precedent autonomy can be exercised through the use of a living will, durable 
power of attorney for health care, or even in less formal ways—telling family and 
friends your preferences in certain circumstances.284 Each of these examples essen-
tially delegates an incapacitated person’s decision-making power to someone else 
to follow the desires previously expressed. Dworkin said, “[w]hen one person is 
entrusted to the charge or care of another, the former has what I shall call a right to 
beneficence—a right that the latter make decisions in the former’s best interest.”285 
He equated this right to beneficence with the fiduciary duties of trustees and direc-
tors of corporations.286  
But what are the best interests of the demented?287 There simply cannot be a 
bright line rule created to answer this question. The best interests of a demented 
individual will always have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Although a 
medical professional’s opinion can be helpful in making this determination, this 
decision should not be left entirely up to a doctor. The person best suited to make 
this determination would be someone who knows the demented person well, both 
before and after the dementia reached the late stages. 
iii. Social Issues 
Some commentators have expressed concern that permitting physician-
assisted death for those diagnosed with dementia could lead to a “social expecta-
tion,” or even a “social obligation” that once you’ve been diagnosed with dementia, 
you should sign an advanced directive so that “when the time comes” you will be 
injected with lethal medication.288 The idea behind this line of reasoning is that the 
U.S. has limited health care resources and people with dementia use up a large part 
of these already limited funds that could otherwise “go to treating sick young chil-
dren or finding a cure for Alzheimer’s.”289 It is imagined that if physician-assisted 
death or euthanasia becomes a welcome practice for the demented, then it could 
become culturally accepted dogma, especially since there is a “cultural belief that 
the severely demented are effectively dead, that their lives are indistinguishable 
from cabbages.”290 
This is essentially a “slippery slope” argument. The unfortunate fact about 
slippery slope arguments is that they can be made about practically anything. Slip-
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pery slope arguments are often used when discussing social or ethical issues.291 
These arguments assert that if a certain practice is accepted (here, physician-
assisted death or euthanasia), then society will plunge down a slippery slope and 
begin permitting more extreme, immoral actions.292 Several proponents of the slip-
pery slope argument use the Dutch as an example.293 Initially in the Netherlands, 
euthanasia was permitted only for the terminally ill who requested it, then for the 
chronically ill, then for those suffering psychologically, and now for incompetent 
patients, including children.294 But, this argument fails to point to the existence of a 
pernicious slippery slope.295 
When using the Dutch example, proponents of the slippery slope argument 
automatically presume that the expansion of the physician-assisted death laws is 
morally wrong.296 But, in fact, most of the defenders of a legal right to die see noth-
ing morally wrong with these instances of euthanasia.297 Many defenders of the 
right to die movement do not think that the option of physician-assisted death or 
euthanasia should be limited to only the “terminally” ill.298 There are other types of 
suffering that are intolerable, including mental suffering for the competent as well 
as the incompetent.299 
Another issue regularly raised by opponents of the right to die movement is 
the possibility that this practice will be abused because there aren’t any legal safe-
guards to prevent such abuse.300 Essentially, this argument states that even if writ-
ten consent is required, it will not always be obtained and it will lead to mass in-
voluntary euthanasia.301 Although this argument is valid in some respects, it is not a 
sufficient argument to justify withholding the right altogether.302 “If the likelihood 
of abuse were thought to be grounds for withholding a right, then much more than 
euthanasia would have to be banned.”303 For example, the right to drive is a right 
that has the potential to be abused, and is abused daily.304 People often break the 
speed limit, run stop signs, drive without a license, or drive under the influence of 
alcohol; however, these risks of abuse are not enough to ban driving altogether.305 
The abuse argument also fails to recognize that abuse is possible even when 
physician-assisted death or euthanasia is prohibited.306 We see stories of “mercy 
killings” often in the news, including spouses taking each other’s lives to grant 
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their last wish to end their suffering.307 It is simply ignorant to think that a legal ban 
on this practice will prevent it from occurring.308 “[T]he choice is not between le-
galizing euthanasia and no euthanasia, with abuse occurring in the former. Instead 
the choice is between euthanasia with or without regulation.”309  
Opponents of the right to die movement believe that “freedom has its limits” 
and do not believe that the right to die is within those limits.310 Society may restrict 
a person’s freedom when that freedom will inflict harm on others, but it is difficult 
to “justify restricting a person’s freedom when that restriction will result in an im-
mense personal harm.”311 Here, restricting a person’s right to die when she is going 
through intense suffering forces her to endure that suffering, even when she would 
prefer not to. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
My proposed solution to this complicated issue is a rather simple one: an ad-
vanced directive delegating this decision to a trusted friend or relative. Cruzan im-
plicitly recognized that states must honor living wills or advanced healthcare direc-
tives.312 In fact, after Cruzan, every state adopted a provision to honor living wills, 
health care proxies, or both.313 Because states already allow for guardians to make 
all decisions regarding someone else’s well-being, it seems natural that this delega-
tion of decision-making could and should extend to end-of-life decisions. 
The differing opinions in the argument over physician-assisted death and eu-
thanasia all seem to stem from the concept of paternalism.314 People tend to believe 
that they always know what is in the best interest for someone else.315 Generally, it 
is thought that the continuation of life is always in the best interest of everyone.316 
However, living just to be alive is not always in the best interest for every person. 
In fact, there are several instances where a hastened death is in the best interest of 
an individual. 
The fundamental disagreement in this debate is the same as the disagreement 
that is in the center of the abortion debate—the value of human life.317 Opponents 
of physician-assisted death, euthanasia, and abortion all argue that these actions are 
a denigration of the sanctity of life.318 However, this ideology could not be further 
from the truth. Individuals that want a hastened, peaceful death for themselves are 
not denigrating the sanctity of life at all. Actually, a quicker, peaceful death shows 
more respect for life than a prolonged, insufferable one.319 Both sides of the physi-
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cian-assisted death argument are united by the value of the sanctity of life, but are 
divided by the best way to interpret it.320 
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